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1. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL DUMPING IN NORTH AMERICA
The advancement of the international trade regime has wit-
nessed rising concern over "social dumping;" social dumping
takes place when industrialists, in an attempt to avoid stringent
labor and environmental regulations in the developed world,
transfer their operations to the developing world. The assump-
tion is that the developing world offers these industrialists a more
lax regulatory climate. Critics of social dumping argue that this
sort of industrial movement transforms developing nations into
"dumping grounds" for the dirty industries of developed nations.
This industrial movement also hurts companies which incur the
additional costs of complying with environmental protection and
worker health regulations in the developed world!
* Ph.D., Harvard University, 1997; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1996;
B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1989. Associate, Shearman & Ster-
ling, New York. I am deeply in debt to MaryannSurrick, Scott Cunningham,
Michael Chien, and all the editors at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law for their diligent work on this article for publica-
tion in the Journal. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely
those of the author and do not reflect the views and opinions of his employer
or any other institution with which he has been associated.
' See Barry I. Castleman, The Export of Hazardous Factories to Developing
Nations, 9 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 569, 569-70 (1979) (establishing a theo-
retical baseline for identifying social dumping); see also David Michaels et. al.,
Economic Development and Occupational Health in Latin America: New Direc-
tions for Public Health in Less Developed Countries, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 536
(1985) (documenting the lax occupational health and safety regulatory culture
encountered in some developing nations).
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The concern over social dumping has led to renewed efforts to
link national labor conditions to trading privileges under interna-
tional free trade agreements. Take for example the negotiation of
regional free trade agreements, such as the European Union
Treaty ("Maastricht"), 2 as well as the formation of global ar-
rangements such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). '
2 Citizens of the European Community feared that the social dumping
created by this industrial flight to the South would"force the workers in other
countries with higher standards to accept lower standards and consequently
downgrade the employment conditions." Roger Blanpain, 1992 and Beyond:
The Impact of the European Community on the Labour Law Systems of Member
Countries, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 403, 404 n.3 (1990). The European Community
responded to such concerns of social dumping in Europe through the har-
monization of national labor standards under the rubric of Community Law
and the development of a judicial doctrine of pre-emption to deal with any
conflicts between national and Community labor legislation. See id. (discussing
how the Member States of the industrialized north fear that social dumping in
Portugal, Spain, and Italy will carry jobs out of northern European nations and
weaken the collective bargaining position of the working population of north-
ern European nations); see also Commission of the European Communities,
Health and Safety at Work in the European Community at 8-9 (1990) (outlin-
ing how the 1987 Single European Act fiarmonizes labor regulatory norms and
directs the Commission of the European Communities to oversee the devel-
opment of technical labor standards at a European level, the incorporation of
these standards into national legislation, and the effective enforcement of these
standards at the regional level); Eugene Daniel Cross, Pre-emption of Member
State Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447, 449-50 (1992) (reviewing the landmark European
Court of Justice decisions outlining the Court's rationale for pre-empting
Member States' right to regulate in certain spheres).
' Similar concerns over the potentially damaging effects of global social
dumping and the need to fashion a legislative and judicial response to this
threat led a diverse coalition of labor organizations, political leaders, and trade
experts from the developed world to fight unsuccessfully to include a"social
clause" in the final text of the WTO Charter. See, e.g., Hans-Goran Myrdal,
Social Clause Issue "Practically Dead," FIN. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at 16. The
proposed social clause would have tied national labor standards to WTO direc-
tives, linking WTO trading privileges to compliance with such directives. Un-
der such a system, nations failing to comply in their treatment of workers with
labor standards established by the WTO- standards guaranteeing workers
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and safe work condi-
tions- could be the subject of trade sanctions. See, e.g., Shada Islam, Tough
Talk. The WTO Gears up for a Contentious Conclave, FAR EASTERN ECON.
REV., Jan. 11, 1996, at 76. The object of the proposed social clause was to tie
economic integ ration and trade liberalization to improvements in global envi-
ronmental and-labor conditions. See id. The fierce resistance of developing na-
tions to the proposed social clause defeated this proposal in the eleventh hiour.
These nations resisted the proposal on the grounds that it could too easily serve
as a protectionist tool used to deny developing nations fair access to first world
markets. See Singapore Warns Against Linking Labour Standards to Trade,
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Debate concerning the negative impact of free trade on labor
conditions, the social dumping it would give rise to, and the ap-
propriate political response necessary to control such social
dumping was particularly fierce during negotiation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").4  Critics of
NAFTA from environmental, civic, and labor grqups faulted the
agreement for its lack of social protections and labor rights guar-
antees. These commentators argued that manufacturers would
easily avoid such social mandates as unemployment insurance,
workers' compensation, and workplace safety and health re-
quirements due to Mexico's lack of a well-developed labor regula-
tory structure. According to such reasoning, NAFTA would
pave the way for social dumping by U.S. and Canadian industrial-
ists who would relocate their manufacturing operations to Mex-
ico in order to escape the stringent workplace standards set in the
U.S. and Canada. An expansion of free trade in North America,
then, would mean a degradation of worker health in Mexico.'
I would characterize the above posture as the "North Ameri-
can Social Dumping Theory," which is founded on the basis of
the following three arguments. First, Mexico, .like most develop-
ing nations, suffers from a disorganized and ineffective labor regu-
latory structure. Second, due to the weakness of its labor regula-
tory policy and practice, Mexico will be the victim of wide-scale
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 29, 1996, at 1; Johanna Son,Asia-Trade: Labor
Rights a Ruse for Protectionism, Say Experts, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 21,
1995, at 1. Despite defeat of the "social clause" in the opening negotiations of
the WTO, the issue of social dumping pervades debate over the future struc-
ture of the WTO. See Islam, supra, at 78.
4 See NAFTA: Unions Attack Agreement for Not Securing Workers' Rights,
MULTINATIONAL SERVICE, Oct. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File; See also Thomas R. Donahue, The Case Against a North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 93, 95; Labor Groups
Pan Mexico Pact, 48 CONG. Q. 2039 (1990) (presenting the U.S. labor union
perspective); Mary Benanti, Union Leaders Say Laws Skew Impact of NAFTA,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (reviewing public statements by the Canadian Labour Con-
gress concerning NAFTA and workers' rights).
' For a more detailed review of the arguments of these critics, see Dona-
hue, supra note 4; Michael J. McGuinness, Hacia una Poiftica Social para Ame§
rica del Norte: Ensayo sobre la Importancia de la Carta Social y el Fondo Estruc-
tural Europeos para el TLCAN, in MfxICO, ESTADOS UNIDOS, CANADA,
1991-92, 131 (Gustavo Vega Canovas ed., 1993); see also NATIONAL SAFE
WORKPLACE INSTITUTE, CRISIS AT OUR DOORSTEP: OCCUPATIONAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO-U.S.-CANADA TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 5-12 (1991).
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social dumping by U.S. and Canadian industries. Third, this so-
cial dumping will degrade workplace safety and health conditions
in Mexico, thus harming Mexican workers. This article examines
in a critical light the soundness of each of these three arguments.
To lay a foundation for this analysis, I begin with a descrip-
tion of Mexico's labor regulatory structure based both on existing
literature and the results of three years of field research that I
conducted in Mexico City, Mexico.6 This review includes a dis-
cussion of the administrative procedures used to sanction em-
ployers in violation of Mexico's labor law. As my discussion
demonstrates, Mexico's labor regulatory structure is essential to
the protection of Mexican workers from illness or injury caused
by workplace conditions.
Building on this review of Mexico's labor enforcement struc-
ture, I consider the argument, taken as an operating premise by
NAFTA critics, that Mexico's labor regulatory structure is inca-
pable of maintaining or enforcing current labor standards. Ac-
cording to this argument, Mexico's labor law enforcement prac-
tices are described as disorganized, ineffectual, and corrupt. A
comparison of these accounts to my initial review of Mexico's la-
bor law structure, however, leads to the conclusion that Mexico's
labor regulatory structure and its supposed deficiencies have re-
6 This research included four principal components conducted over the
three years from 1994 to 1997. First, I conducted a review of Mexico's formal
labor code and the regulatory structure used to enforce it in the workplace. I
did this through analysis of the relevant policy, administrative, and legal
documents. This review also included multiple interviews with administrators
and policy officials in Mexico's Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Secre-
taria del Trabajo y Previsi6n Social). Second, I participated in 38 labor inspec-
tions, observing the actual enforcement techniques used by inspectors and the
array of obstacles to such enforcement activities encountered by inspectors in
the Mexican workplace. Third, I solicited the responses of these inspectors to a
formal questionnaire and conducted in-depth, directed interviews with a sam-
ple of inspectors. The purpose of the questionnaire and directed interviews
was to give labor inspectors a chance to document their actual inspection prac-
tices in their own words. Fourth, and finally, I interviewed labor union offi-
cials, non-governmental health researchers, and representatives of the business
community. These concerned parties possess an important, critical view of the
development and application of labor norms. Their comments balance the "of-
ficial" reports of government workers and, in this way, have assisted me in
documenting the actual form of Mexico's labor regulatory structure and sug-
gesting refinements to this model. The results of this research are located inMichael Joseph McGuinness, The Landscape of Labor Law Enforcement in North
America: An Examination of Mexico's Labor Regulatory Policy and Practice, 29
LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 365 (1998) [hereinafter Summary Article].
[Vol. 21:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss1/1
LABOR LA WENFOR CEMENTIN MEXICO
ceived much public attention but little rigorous analysis. Further,
such accounts do not recognize the significant monitoring sys-
tems used to supervise enforcement activities and combat any acts
of corruption by government officials.
Proceeding from accounts of Mexico's current labor enforce-
ment practices, I examine the second argument inherent in the
North American Social Dumping Theory-the position that in a
free trade environment Mexico would be the recipient of wide-
scale social dumping. My examination of the argument begins by
analyzing the ability of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to enforce U.S. labor standards strictly, thereby
creating a regulatory environment which would give U.S. corpo-
rations an incentive to engage in social dumping in Mexico. This
discussion also includes a brief consideration of literature examin-
ing the relatively insignificant role that environmental and labor
regulation plays in corporate decisions concerning the relocation
of manufacturing operations. The effect of this review is to ques-
tion the underlying premise that Mexico will have great potential
to become a victim of wide-scale social dumping.
In conclusion, I consider those studies reported in the litera-
ture on workplace health and safety conditions along Mexico's
northern border in connection with the third argument support-
ing the North American Social Dumping Theory. For more than
thirty years, multinational corporations have invested heavily in
the development of manufacturing operations in the industrial
strip referred to as the Maquiladora Zone. Thus, an analysis of
current occupational health conditions in this area might tell us
whether U.S. and Canadian investment in Mexico has had a nega-
tive effect on working conditions in Mexico, particularly on the
health of Mexican workers. The results of this analysis, however,
are inconclusive with respect to the negative or positive impact of
foreign manufacturing operations in Mexico.
The larger purpose of this article is to present an alternative
description of Mexico's labor regulatory structure, one that, while
recognizing that Mexico's enforcement practices suffer from a
number of shortcomings, is based on a detailed field examination
of its actual form and functioning and an appreciation for the sig-
nificant obstacles that make it so difficult to protect the well-
being of laborers both in Mexico and elsewhere in North Amer-
ica. To this end, my discussion will reveal that relatively little is
known about either actual workplace conditions or regulation in
2000]
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Mexico, despite extensive and negative accounts that describe
Mexico's labor regulatory structure as disorganized and ineffec-
tual.
2. MEXICO'S LABOR REGULATORY STRUCTURE:
A BRIEF REVIEW 
7
It is important to note that, although the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC") does not create a
harmonized regime of North American labor standards, it does
require all NAFTA members to enforce their domestic labor
laws. In this way, the NAALC places labor regulation on the
North American labor policy agenda, giving national labor en-
forcement schemes and their alleged deficiencies a central role in
debates over the importance of free trade in the Americas. Thus,
in the wake of the passage of the NAALC, the labor regulatory
structures employed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico
have become the objects of international scrutiny.
Mexico's federal labor law draws its life from the well-spring
of the 1917 Political Constitution, a far-reaching and historic ef-
fort to define the social rights of Mexico's workers. In this decla-
ration of rights, the Mexican state carries responsibility for pro-
tecting workers through laws guaranteeing them a minimum level
of economic, social, and cultural well-being.8 Devoted to this
ideal of the paternalistic State,9 the framers of the Constitution at-
tempted to provide the fullest protection possible to the Mexican
worker, expressing an explicit commitment to improve the living
and working conditions of Mexican workers and to honor their
inherent rights and respect their human dignity.1" Article 123 of
the Constitution establishes a number of fundamental labor stan-
dards in order to ensure dignified work for Mexican laborers, in-
7 Mexico's Political Constitution was the first constitution in the world to
include social rights in its text. MARIO DE LA CUEVA, EL NUEVO LEY
LABORAL 22 (1985); EMILIO 0. RABASA & GLORIA CABALLERO, MEXICANO:
ESTA Es Tu CONsTITucI6N 359 (1994).
S An abridged discussion of Mexico's Labor Regulatory Structure can be
found in Summary Article, supra note 6.
9 BORIS KoZOLCHYK, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE SPIRIT OF MEXICO'S
"NEW" LABOR LAW 2 (National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade
ed., 1994).
'0 CONSTITUCI6N POLfTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art.
123 (1917).
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cluding standards controlling the work day, working conditions,
and the Mexican laborer's right to organize.
These broad declarations are given more specific form by an
array of federal laws and regulations, the most important of these
being Mexico's 1970 Federal Labor Act. To implement Mexico's
constitutional mandates, this Act establishes labor standards in a
number of areas, including employment relations, 2 general work
conditions (work turns, rest days, vacations, and compensation),
wages, employee profit sharing, 3 work conditions for special
classes-such as women and qualified minors (ages 14-16), work
risks and employer compensation requirements for work acci-
dents and illnesses, 4 the enforcement role of the State; and the
employer's responsibility to provide workers with a safe and hy-
gienic work environment.16 For special industries, such as the air-
line or train industries,1 7 this Act established standards including
those dealing with employee organizations, labor unions, collec-
tive bargaining, and strikes.'
Mexico's Federal Regulation on Workplace Safety, Hygiene,
and Environment complements the occupational safety and
health standards set out by the Federal Labor Act. This Regula-
tion establishes the framework for those safety and health stan-
dards and preventive measures necessary to protect and promote
the well-being of the Mexican worker. 9 More specifically, the
" Specifically, the Mexican Constitution sets an eight-hour work day and
a maximum work week of six days for all Mexican laborers. Id. art. 123(1, IV).
It restricts the labor of minors. Id art. 123(1). It mandates three-month ma-
ternity leave, equal pay for equal work, and a minimum wage organized by re-
gion and industry. Id. art. 123(V-VII). And it guarantees freedom of associa-
tion, including the right to form unions and to strike in order to improve
working conditions. Id. art. 123(XVI-XIX). Article 123 further places the
onus upon the employers to provide workers with a safe workplace and to
implement constitutional and- legislative guarantees concerning safety and
health in the workplace. Id. art. 123(XV). Thus, this legal regime holds the
employer responsible for work accidents and illnesses. Id. art. 123(XTV).
12 Id. arts. 20-55.
11 Id. arts. 56-131.
14 Id. arts. 472-522.
's Id. arts. 523-1010.
16 Id. arts. 164-180, 472-522.
17 Id. arts. 164-353.
's Id. arts. 354-471.
'" "Reglamento Federal de Seguridad, Higiene y Medio Ambiente de Tra-
bajo," D.O., 21 de abril de 1997.
2000]
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Regulation focuses on: prevention and protection against fires;
operation, modification, and maintenance of industrial equip-
ment; use of power tools; handling, transport and storage of
flammable, corrosive, or toxic substances; environmental condi-
tions; personal safety equipment; general hygiene conditions; and
internal safety and health programs."0 Most importantly, this
regulation links workplace safety and health conditions to those
limits established by Official Mexican Standards.
The Federal Law of Measurement and Standards creates a re-
gime of Official Mexican Standards ("OMSs") which give specific
form to the broad occupational safety and health mandates in the
Federal Labor Act and the General Regulation on Workplace
Safety and Health.2 Of the existing 104 OMSs, the first thirty are
the most generally applicable. These first thirty standards define
the legal workplace exposure limits for noise, vibration, tempera-
ture, ventilatioh, illumination, radiation, and toxic chemical sub-
stances.' In addition, they establish provisions for the prevention
of fires, the use of personal protective equipment, and the posting
of warning signs concerning workplace safety and health. 3 The
remaining OMSs prescribe specific procedures for evaluating and
limiting exposure to eighty-two dangerous chemical substances.
24
Although Mexico's 1917 Constitution makes no mention of a
specific labor regulatory structure to enforce the labor standards
it sets forth, the 1976 Federal Public Administration Act (Ley
Orgainica de la Administraci6n Pidblica Federal) entrusts imple-
mentation of federal labor law in Mexico's workplaces to the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaria del Trabajo y
Previsi6n Social).2 ' To carry out its mandate, the Ministry has
20 Id. arts. 26-94, 101-113.
21 "Ley Federal sobre Metrologa y Normalizacion," D.O., 1 de julio de
1992, at art. 40(VI.
22 NORMAS OFICIALES MEXICANAS: [NOM]-010-STPS-1993; NOM-
011-STPS-1993; NOM-012-STPS-1993; NOM-013-STPS-1993; NOM-
015-STPS-1993; NOM-016-STPS-1993; NOM-024-STPS-1993; NOM
-025-STPS-1993.
Normas Oficiales Mexicanas: NOM-002-STPS-1993; NOM-017-
STPS-1993; NOM-027-STPS-1993.
24 Normas Oficiales Mexicanas: NOM-031-STPS-1993 through NOM
-112-STPS-1994.
2s LEY ORGANICA DE LA ADMINISTRAcION POBLICA FEDERAL
["L.O.A.P.F."] art. 40 (1992).
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organized a labor regulatory structure dedicated to a number of
enforcement activities. Specifically, this enforcement structure:
1) implements all existing labor standards;
2) monitors the development of all new labor standards, in-
cluding health and safety standards;
3) organizes labor inspections;
4) collaborates with local Workplace Safety and Health
Commissions (Commissiones Mixtas de Seguridad e
Higiene) in activities related to inspection as well as those
that reduce worker exposure to risk;
5) sanctions employers who violate labor standards; and
6) disseminates information on labor standards to wokers
and employers.26
The labor inspections organized by the Ministry of Labor are
the Ministry's most important tool for ensuring that employers
comply with labor standards. Consistent with the requirements
of federal labor law, the Ministry schedules bi-annual inspections
at each factory within its jurisdiction.' The Ministry may in-
crease or decrease the frequency of these periodic inspections
based on its evaluation of the business establishment's risk class,
factory size, and compliance history.28 These inspections gener-
ally result in twin verification inspections.29 Thus, in any given
year, the average manufacturing operation receives four federal
labor inspections.
During each year, the Ministry performs these inspections by
industrial sector. Each month a battery of inspections is sched-
uled in one or two pre-selected industrial sectors. For example,
labor inspections in November of 1995 concentrated almost ex-
26 Id.
REGLAMENTO DE INSPECCI6N FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO art. 27 (1983)
[hereinafter Inspection Law].
28 Id.
29 "Manual General de Organizacion de la Secretaria del Trabajo y Pre-
visi6n Social," D.O., 5 dejulio de 1993 [hereinafter Inspector's Manual].
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clusively on the food industry. During the preceding month, the
mining sector was the focus of the Ministry's enforcement activi-
ties.
In 1995, the Ministry of Labor conducted 48,711 labor inspec-
tions throughout Mexico using 276 federal labor inspectors.3 In
Mexico City and the outlying industrial valleys alone, seventy-
seven federal inspectors carried out 20,500 labor inspections, with
each inspector averaging 267 labor inspections for the year.31 In
1996, the GDFLI carried out 47,255 federal labor inspections in
Mexico. In Mexico City and its outlying industrial areas, eighty-
eight federal inspectors carried out 20,751 inspections, with each
inspector averaging 236 inspections for the year.
32
Two specific types of labor inspection- the general work
conditions inspection and the workplace safety and health inspec-
tion- verify employer compliance with a major portion of Mex-
ico's labor law. Inspections of general work conditions verify
employer compliance with mandatory federal standards concern-
ing employment contracts, salary scales, internal factory regula-
tions, work shifts, over-time, federal holidays, vacations, senior-
ity, employee profit-sharing, the work of women and minors,
employer contributions to social security and public housing pro-
grams, worker training and education, promotion practices, and
employee cultural and social benefits.33 Inspections of workplace
safety and health conditions examine actual working conditions
on the plant floor. These inspections confirm employer compli-
ance with workspace structure, fire prevention facilities, the use
of industrial equipment, handling of corrosive, toxic, and explo-
sive substances, environmental conditions (noise, vibration, illu-
mination, etc.), personal protective equipment, plant medical
services, the activities of the Workplace Safety and Health Com-
30 ORGANIGRAMA: DELEGACIONES FEDERALES DEL TRABAJO, INFORME
ENERO-SEPTIEMBRE DE 1995 (1995) [hereinafter ORGANIGRAMA].
"' The total inspections in Mexico City and the outlying industrial valleys
represents a twenty-five percent increase from the year before. Id.
32 See id.
33 See CATALOGO DE CONCEPTOS QUE REQUIERE LA INSPECCI6N DE LAS
CONDICIONES GENERALES DE TRABAJO 1-5 (1994) [hereinafter CATALOG OF
CONCEPTS]; MANUAL PARA LA INSPECCI6N DE LAS CONDICIONES
GENERALES DE TRABAJO 11-16 (1994) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR INSPECTION].
Cultural and social benefits include the employer s provision of educational
grants, literacy programs, and sports facilities to workers. CATALOG OF
CONCEPTS, supra, at 43.
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mission, preventive occupational health services, safety and health
warnings, and employer reports on work-related accidents and
illnesses.34
To assist inspectors in their review of employer compliance,
the Ministry of Labor publishes a number of official Inspection
Protocols which prescribe the procedure for each type of inspec-
tion. Since labor inspectors employ these protocols religiously in
their inspection practices,35 they play a central role in defining
how actual labor inspections unfold. Specifically, these protocols
control how the labor inspector enters the workplace and assem-
bles those persons necessary for the inspection to go forward (in-
cluding the employer or the employer's representative, the union
delegate, representatives of the Workplace Safety and Health
Commission, and two witnesses). They direct the inspector's ex-
amination of the variety of books, records, and additional busi-
ness documents which the Federal Labor Act requires the em-
ployer to present during an inspection.36
3' See CATALOG OF CONCEPTS, supra note 33, at 1-5; MANUAL FOR
INSPECTION, supra note 33, at 11-16.
3' The field survey found that 97% of federal labor inspectors relied on the
Ministry's Official Inspection Protocols during their inspection visits. See
MICHAEL J. MCGUINNESS, ENCUESTA PARA LOS INSPECTORES FEDERALES
DEL TRABAJO DE LA SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SOCIAL 120
(1995) [hereinafter FIELD SURVEY].
36 See SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SOCIAL, LEY FEDERAL DEL
TRABAJO art. 804 (1970) [hereinafter L.F.T.] (listing items such as individual
contracts, collective contracts, salary schedules, time cards, and pay stubs). See
Inspector's Manual, supra note 29, for a complete list of the documents re-
quired in a General Work Conditions Inspection; see also L.F.T., supra, arts.
541 and 804(V).
The number and content of documents reviewed is extensive, ranging from
simple documents which verify the business's name, address, and Treasury reg-
istration number to the complex and confidential documents which reveal the
intimate details of the plant's production process, collective contract, employee
compensation plan, worker accident reports, and internal safety programs.
The inspector must not only verify the existence of the documents, but also
examine their content. The content review is demanding. For example, in any
inspection, the inspector must read through the articles of incorporation not
only to confirm the business' name and address but also to check that the name
of the legal representative and correct power of attorney for administrative acts
appear. - he inspector must also examine the promotion procedures and provi-
sions for employee training and continuing education contained in the plant's
collective contract. The inspector must scrutinize a random sample of pay
stubs to verify that they: correspond to the collective contract; c early state
over-time, vacation, and Sunda work pay; and are signed by the worker re-
ceiving the pay. All work accident and illness reports and the documents con-
cerning the Workplace Safety and Health Commission need to be authenti-
2000]
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These Protocols also control the form of the labor inspector's
tour of factory facilities. An essential component of the work-
place safety and health inspection, the factory tour seeks to detect
and remedy dangerous work conditions and practices."' It usually
involves interviews by the inspector with at least three workers. 8
Each worker interview usually lasts about ten minutes during
which the labor inspector questions the worker about factory
work conditions, the employer's conduct, and the plant work
culture in general. 9 Finally, these Protocols determine the order
in which the inspector prepares, revises, and distributes the offi-
cated and then evaluated to see if they reflect a serious effort to combat unsafe
work conditions. This description covers but a small sample of the demanding
.content" review that the inspector makes each day. In one day, during a nine
hour inspection, the labor inspector will examine more than sixty separate
documents for both content and form.
37 The tour enerally begins with the area where raw materials arrive and
are stored, and follows these materials as the production process transforms
them. This initial portion of the tour concludes with the shipping point where
the finished product leaves the factory. The inspector checks eacl area for safe
and healthy work conditions. Having reviewed the actual production areas,
the inspector examines the factory's maintenance facilities, fire safety equip-
ment and fire exits, bathrooms, lockers, cafeteria, first-aid stations and medical
facility, and any other factory areas that support production. The tour re-
quires a slow, methodical process, focused on the end result, the inspector's list
of suggested measures. These measures seek to modify work processes, condi-
tions, and installations to the extent that such modifications can improve
workplace safety and health. They are formalized in the Inspection Report
and thus become the basis for required workplace safety and health measures
issued by the Ministry of Labor at a later date.
38 See FIELD SURvEY, supra note 35, at #23.
" Though official inspection policy is to question the workers on those
declarations by employers which appear specious, neither Inspection Protocols
nor Ministry policy dictate the subject matter to be coveredduring a worker
interview. Several common themes, however, arise during these interviews.
With respect to workplace safety and health, inspectors usually inquire about
the quality of environmental conditions and the safety of the machinery with
which the worker comes in contact. The worker is encouraged to divulge any
known work risks or recent accidents or illnesses in the plant. The inspector
asks the laborer about the adequacy and comfort of the employer-provided
safety equipment. On the subject of general work conditions, the inspector
questions the worker concerning any irregularities in the method of his pay-
ment, in the allocation of his vacation, or the provision of le ally-required
work benefits. The inspector also often interrogates the worker aout the ade-
quacy of on-the-job and continuing training. Often, the inspector questions
the employee about the general work culture of the business and whether he
considers it abusive in any way. The inspector concludes each interview by
allowing the worker to make any comments or observations he considers rele-
vant.
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cial Inspection Report to the employer and the Ministry of La-
bor.40
The official Inspection Report- and its preparation, revision,
and distribution- is one of the most difficult and important parts
of the entire inspection.4 A number of requirements shape the
Inspection Report. Generally, the material content of the Inspec-
tion Report varies with each type of inspection (initial, periodic,
verification, or extraordinary) and the inspection subject matter
(general work conditions, workplace safety and health, steam
generators and pressure vessels). The inspector gathers the raw
material for each Inspection Report from the review of documen-
tation related to employer compliance as well as direct observa-
tion of workplace conditions. In the Inspection Report, the in-
spector describes all of the documents reviewed, the results of the
review, and first-hand observations of workplace safety and
health conditions in the plant.' Also included are the formal dec-
larations of the worker representatives and employer concerning
the content of the official Inspection Report.' Further, while
conducting the factory tour, the labor inspector records a number
of suggested measures to enhance worker safety. Such measures
normally recommend improvements to the business' installations,
machinery, or equipment.' The labor inspector includes sug-
gested measures in his Inspection Report.
This Inspection Report is not only important as a record of
the inspection but also as a tool for the Ministry to compel em-
40 Once the Official Inspection Report is prepared, the labor inspector in-
vites the employer and worker representatives to review it for any errors. Fol-
lowing this review, the inspector incorporates any declarations, comments, or
observations that any representative wishes to include in the final text of the
Inspection Report. The employer's representative, labor representative, two
witnesses, and two members of the Workplace Safety and Health Commission
are required to sign the Inspection Report.
4 See L.F.T., supra note 36, art. 542(IV); Inspection Law, supra note 27,
art. 38.
42 See L.F.T., supra note 36, art. 541(I).
43 See Inspector's Manual, supra note 29, at 44.
4 L.F.T., supra note 36, art. 512-D. Only these measures will be reviewed
by the Division of Labor Standards. The employer's failure to present a re-
quired document- e.g., a license, register, or authorization required by the
law- leads to an immediate sanction. The Division of Labor Standards sends
notice of such violations directly to the General Division of Legal Affairs who
will initiate the sanctioning procedure. See SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO Y
PREVISION SOCIAL, MANUAL INTERNAL DE LA DIVISION GENERAL DE
INSPEccI6N FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO (1995) [hereinafter INTERNAL MANUAL].
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ployers to improve workplace conditions.4" In fact, Ministry offi-
cials base their decision to begin the Administrative Sanctioning
Procedure-the procedure which sanctions employers in violation
of federal labor law-against a particular employer on an evalua-
tion of the official Inspection Report and the labor law violations
reported therein.46 Before the employer is sanctioned, the Minis-
try notifies the employer of the sanctionable labor violations
through a summons and advises him of the period of time in
which he must respond in writing.47 In this response, the em-
ployer has the right to assert defenses or request exceptions and to
offer evidence with respect to the alleged non-compliant behav-
ior.4" Generally, about forty percent of employers choose to re-
spond in writing to the Ministry's summons.49 If the Ministry
" As the above discussion demonstrates, during the factory tour, the labor
inspector records a number of suggested measures meant to enhance worker
safety. See L.F.T., supra note 36, art. 512-D. The labor inspector includes his
suggested measures f6r the improvement of workplace health and safety condi.
tions in his Official Inspection Report. The inspector's recommendations,
however, remain non-binding until they receive the approval of Ministry of
Labor administrators, an approval that follows review of 1) the object and con-
text of the measure, 2) its legal foundation, and 3) the inspector's statement of
the recommended measures. Ministry officials approve the majority of the
measures suggested by labor inspectors, transforming such measures into bind-
ing legal obligations. Once a universe of recommended measures has been set,
the Ministry establishes a Compliance Calendar and notifies the employer of
the terms of this Calendar. Generally, the Compliance Calendar requires the
employer to implement the obligatory measures within fifteen to thirty days,
though, in cases of imminent danger, the Calendar may assign certain measures
for immediate implementation. See L.F.T., supra note 36, arts. 512, 541(VI);
Inspection Law, supra note 27, art. 12. The Ministry of Labor then schedules a
verification inspection to check the employer's aderence to the Compliance
Calendar. If the employer fails to comply with the assigned obligatory meas-
ures, the labor inspector will record this failure in his Inspection Report and
administrative sanctioning procedures against the employer will commence.
"REGLAMENTO GENERAL PARA LA INSPECCION Y APLICACION DE SANCIONES
POR VIOLACIONES A LA LEGISLACI6N LABORAL," (General Regulation Apply-
ing the Inspection and Application of Sanctions for Violations of Federa La-
bor Law) D.O., 6 de julio de 1998, arts. 21-22, 30-38 [hereinafter Sanctions
Regulation].
46 See Sanctions Regulation, supra note 45, arts. 21-22, 30-38.
47 See id. arts. 31-32.
48 See id. art. 35.
'9 In 1996, forty-one percent of the employers who received General Divi-
sion of Legal Affairs ("GDLA") summons submitted written responses offering
proof of compliance or asserting legal defenses. See SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO
Y PREVISION SOCIAL, DIRECCION GENERAL DE AsuNTos JURfDICOS,
RESUMEN DE PRODUCTIVIDAD CORRESPONDIENTE AL AiO DE 1996 [herein-
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finds the employer's response compelling, it terminates the Ad-
ministrative Sanctioning Procedure against the employer. Only
about six percent of employers' responses, however, halt the sanc-
tioning procedure in this manner.5 If the Ministry finds this re-
sponse unpersuasive- which is the case in more than 90% of the
submitted responses- it drafts a Sanction Order describing the
amount of, and legal basis for, each aspect of the total fine. The
employer can choose to ignore the Summons, as do almost 60%
of the employers in receipt of this document.51 In such a case, the
Ministry assumes that the allegations contained in the Summons
are true and drafts the relevant Sanction Order.
5 2
On a yearly basis, the Ministry begins the Administrative
Sanctioning Procedure for 5,500 to 6,000 employers. Between
85% and 90% of these requests result in Sanction Orders. 3 In
1995, the Ministry issued sanctions to 5,485 employers, with the
after GDLA Year-End Report]; Interview, General Division of Legal Affairs,
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, November, 1996.
" In 1996, fewer than six percent of the employers' written responses suc-
cessfully terminated the Administrative Sanctioning Procedure. See GDLA
Year-End Report, supra note 49.
51 In 1996, 2,458 employers chose not to respond to the GDLA's sum-
mons. See id.
52 Sanctions Regulation, supra note 45, art. 32.
s An employer who disagrees with the Sanction Order has the right of
appeal. In fact, employers contest thirty percent of the Ministry s Sanction
Orders, using one of three available avenues of appeal. First, the employer
may exercise his "right of review" (Recurso de Revisi6n) at the Ministry of La-
bor within fifteen working days of notification of the Sanction Order. See LEY
FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO arts. 83 and 85 1992). One
third of total appeals take advantage of this right of review, though only about
five percent ofthese appeals prevail. Interview, General Division of Legal Af-
fairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, 1996. Second, the employer may
appeal to Mexico's lower federal court (Tribunal Fiscal) for a reversal (Juicio e
Nulidad) within 45 days of the Sanction Order. See Codigo Fiscal (C.F.F.), art.
207 (1981). Nearly two thirds of total appeals are heard by this court, which
reverses about 25% of Ministry Sanction Orders contested before it. See Inter-
view, General Division of Legal Affairs, supra note 49. Third, in those rare
cases where the employer can claim that the provision of labor legislation con-
trolling his case violates Mexico's constitution, he/she may make a"constitu-
tional appeal" (juicio de amparo indirecto) before Mexico's federal court of ap-
peals -Tribunal Colegiado). See Ley de Amparo, arts. 114, 115. Such
constitutional appeals represent fewer than twelve cases a year and only have a
ten percent success rate. See Interview, supra note 49. Thus, given the above
figures, only about 18% of employer appeals of Sanction Orders are successful,
which means only 6% of the total number of Sanction Orders emitted by the
Ministry of Labor are ultimately reversed. See GDLA Year-End Report, supra
note 49.
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average sanction being New Mexican Pesos $622.65 (about U.S.
$75). The number of sanctioned employers decreased to 4,735 in
1996, while the average sanction increased by 23% to New Mexi-
can Pesos $762.82 (about U.S. $100).54 This reflects a policy trend
in the Ministry towards levying fewer, but higher, fines.
As this brief review has demonstrated, Mexico does have a la-
bor regulatory structure characterized by strong legislative man-
dates, rigorous inspection procedures, and a functioning sanction-
ing mechanism. This is the case even though a number of news
and academic commentaries paint a sad picture of a disorganized
and ineffectual enforcement structure, corrupt and incompetent
inspectors, and aloof and indifferent government functionaries.
In the following section, I consider in more detail the negative
portrayal of Mexico's labor law enforcement practices which has
become such common currency in the United States and Canada.
3. CRITICAL COMMENTARIES ON MEXICAN LABOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT
Common descriptions of Mexico's labor regulatory structure
support the view that Mexico's labor regulatory structure is dis-
organized and ineffectual and that such weakness invites social
dumping in Mexico (i.e., the southern migration of dirty U.S. and
Canadian industries). This view, which is summed up by the first
and second arguments of the North American Social Dumping
Theory, can be quite damning. During the negotiation of
NAFTA, several U.S. lawmakers described Mexican workplace
safety and health standards in particular as "much weaker than
their U.S. counterparts" and Mexican labor law in general as
"generations, decades, and maybe centuries" behind U.S. stan-
s In 1995, the Ministry reviewed 6,069 cases for potential sanction. It
chose to process 5,635 (93%) of these requests through the Administrative
Sanctioning Procedure. As a result of this procedure, it absolved 150 employ-
ers after reviewing the contents of their written responses to the Ministry
Summons and emitted 5,485 Sanction Orders for the year. In 1996, the Minis-
try received 5,544 sanction requests, processing 4,860 (88%) of these requests,
absolving 125 employers, and emitting 4,735 Sanction Orders. GDLA
Year-End Report, supra note 49. In 1996, the average fine was N$762.82 (about
U.S. $100), a 23% increase from the 1995 figure (N$622.65). As well, the total
amount of fines assigned in 1996 was N$3,611,995.07, a 6% increase from the
1995 figure (N$3,415,258.20). See id. This assumes an exchange rate of $8.00
Mexican Pesos to the U.S. Dollar.
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dards.55 According to such accounts, Mexican labor law, which
provides an inferior legislative structure to that in place in the
U.S. and Canada, is incapable of protecting Mexico's laborers in
the workplace. Lane Kirkland, the former president of the
AFL-CIO, even went so far as to compare the problem of child
labor in Mexico to "any of the well-publicized disasters of the
worst Stalinist regimes." 6 More reasonable criticism, even where
it acknowledges the strength of Mexico's statutory labor law, ar-
gues that such law is rarely enforced."' One attorney has de-
scribed in general terms the "massive and pervasive trend in...
[Mexico]... of de facto failure to enforce labor law rights and
standards," a trend that threatens to eliminate entirely worker
rights and standards in the near future." Certain of these critics
have rendered precise estimates of the enforcement capacity of the
Mexican government, with one U.S. writer describing enforce-
ment of constitutionally guaranteed worker rights in Mexico as
"reasonably adequate" for only 15% of the companies in the pri-
vate sector.
59
Explanations of the underlying causes of Mexico's poor en-
forcement practices vary. According to a study conducted by
Human Rights Watch, the violation of anti-sex-discrimination
laws in Mexico arises largely as a result of the failure of state regu-
latory efforts to monitor employer compliance with Mexico's law
in this area; specifically, labor inspectors at the state level were ei-
ther unwilling or, due to poor training, incapable of investigating
claims of sex discrimination.0 Other commentators attribute
" Stephen F. Befort & Virginia E. Cornett, Beyond the Rhetoric of the
NAFTA Treaty Debate: A Comparative Analysis of Labor and Employment Law
in Mexico and the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 269, 269 n.3 (1996).
56 Id. at 270 n.8.
" See Ernest F. Hollings, Reform Mexico First, 93 FOREIGN POL'Y 91, 100
(1993-94); Guillermo Marrero, Labor Issues for Maquiladoras, LATIN AM. L. &
Bus. REP., May 31, 1996.
58 David M. Helfeld, NAALC in the Eyes of the Beholder, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 365, 368 (1995) (citing Manuel Fuentes Muniz, Presentation at the
Connecticut Journal of International Law Symposium, NAFTA at Age One: A
Blueprint for Hemispheric Integration? (Mar. 16, 1995)).
5 Joan M. Smith, North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Work-
ing Children, 4 TEMP. POL. Civ. RTS. L. REV. 57, 75 (1994) (quoting U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992
§6(d)).
0 See Joel Solomon, No Guarantee: Sex-Based Discrimination in the Maqui-
ladora Zone, HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. 40-42 (1996).
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such lax enforcement practices to corrupt labor inspectors or a
disorganized inspection system.6
Another explanation for poor enforcement is a lack of politi-
cal will, common among Mexico's labor administrators. Some
argue that, in order to encourage foreign investment and manu-
facturing in Mexico, the Mexican government has adopted a
"hands-off" approach to labor law enforcement.62 In their eyes,
the Mexican government is more interested in attracting and then
appeasing foreign investors than in aggressively protecting the
rights of Mexican workers.63 To cultivate foreign manufacturing
operations, Mexican labor authorities thus ignore or even con-
done violations of labor law." According to Susanna Peters, be-
cause of the potential for economic growth in the Maquiladora
Zone and in an attempt to entice foreign investors, the Mexican
government is slow to apply its labor law.6" Other commentators
have attributed the lack of enforcement they find to the pervasive
co-optation and corruption of labor union leaders.66
Such negative characterizations of Mexico's labor regulatory
structure find reinforcement in recent press accounts concerning
political corruption in Mexico. In a string of news stories, the
North American public has read of evidence linking former
President Salinas de Gortari, several of his family members (par-
ticularly his father and older brother), two former directors of
Mexico's National Institute for Combating Drugs, and several
prominent Mexican politicians (including Mexico's former Dep-
uty Attorney General, the former Secretary General of PRI, and
61 See JAVIER ORTEGA, LA NORMATIVIDAD DE LA SALUD EN EL TRABAJO
EN MEXICO (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Salud Piiblica, Work-
ing Paper, 1992).
62 See Elizabeth C. Crandall, Comment, Will NAFTA's North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation Imp rove Enforcement of Mexican Labor Laws?,
7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 165, 177 (1994).
63 See Susanna Peters, Comment, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing
Between Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 226, 247
(1990).
See generally Manuel Fuentes Muniz, La Imposician Laboral Que Nos Vi-
ene Del Norte (1994), in Manuel Fuentes Muniz, The NAFTA Labor Side Accord
in Mexico and Its Repercussions for Workers, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 379 n.5
(1995).
6 See Peters, supra note 63, at 234-35.
66 See Amy H. Goldin, Comment, Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled
by the Lack of Democracy in Trade Unions, 11 COM. LAB. L.J. 203, 209-10
(1990).
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two current state governors), to Mexican and Latin American
drug dealers.67 According to the testimony of FBI, DEA, and
Mexican federal agents reported in these news articles, these
prominent political figures have received massive monthly
pay-offs, some totaling U.S. $100 million, in exchange for their
protection of the flourishing drug trade in the Americas; this tes-
timony also implicates several of these government officials in ac-
tual drug dealing activities, political assassination, money launder-
ing, and other unseemly abuses of political office such as the
trafficking of influence, the misappropriation of government
funds, and the obstruction of criminal justice.
This litany of alleged abuses by Mexico's political elite makes
it easier to believe those accounts of Mexico's labor regulatory
structure which maintain this structure is a disorganized failure,
staffed by dishonest inspectors, organized by indifferent political
appointees, and characterized by massive and pervasive corrup-
tion. A number of considerations argue against such a quick con-
clusion. Specifically, current accounts of Mexico's labor regula-
tory enforcement practices need to be reconsidered within the
context of: 1) unfair stereotypes of Mexico's workers and public
officials, 2) the incomplete nature of many of these reports, 3) al-
ternative explanations for the shortcomings of Mexico's regula-
tory practices, and 4) current anti-corruption programs at Mex-
ico's Ministry of Labor.
First, a number of commentators have argued that common
negative depictions of Mexico's labor regulatory structure repre-
sent "Mexico bashing and race baiting."6" As these commentators
have pointed out, much of the rhetoric used during the 1993
NAFTA debate was "based on stereotypes about Mexico" and on
the assumption that the Mexican government deliberately carries
out a policy of non-enforcement of its labor law.69 In this sense,
representations of Mexico's labor regulatory structure which
paint it as a disorganized failure, staffed by dishonest inspectors,
67 See Sam Dillon & Craig Pyes, Drug Ties Taint 2 Mexican Governors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at Al; Julia Preston, A General in Mexico's Drug
War is Dismissed on Narcotics Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at Al; Julia
Preston, Salinas Brothers Issue Denials in U.S. Drug Trafficking Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at A10.
68 Hispanic Leader Warns NAFTA Debate Drifting into "Evil Mixture of
Prejudice and Ignorance;" Political Counterattack to Focus on Merits, PR
NEWSWMRE, May 30, 1993 [hereinafter Hispanic Leader].
69 Befort & Cornett, supra note 55, at 270.
2000]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
organized by indifferent political appointees, and characterized by
massive and pervasive corruption and which describe work condi-
tions in Mexico as squalid, exploitive, and beyond the pale, even
for a poor country, have an underpinning political motivation.
According to such a reading, opponents of NAFTA have
found one of their "weapons of choice" for their campaign against
continental trade and integration in their criticism of Mexico's la-
bor regulatory practices.' It is no accident that the majority of
the complaints which have come before the U.S. National Ad-
ministrative Office alleging Mexico's incomplete enforcement of
its labor law are sponsored by U.S. unions, one of the chief op-
ponents to expanded trade and economic relations between the
United States and Mexico. Unions worry that low wages for
semi-skilled workers in Mexico will reduce the wages of their
own workers. This concern manifests itself in persistent calls for
legislative limits to control social dumping as well as current rep-
resentations of Mexico's labor regulatory efforts. By portraying
Mexico's labor regulatory structure as founded on weak standards
and plagued by incompetence, indifference, and corruption, op-
ponents of NAFTA are able to diminish the stature of Mexico as
a trading partner. The objective is to cause a reconsideration of
the merits of the original NAFTA free trade agenda and stall any
further improvements in bilateral relations.
Supporting these efforts are broad and pervasive cultural
stereotypes about Mexico and the Mexicans. The image of the
lazy Mexican worker or the corrupt government official has oc-
cupied the imagination of the U.S. public since before the Treaty
of Guadelupe, regardless of its connection to social reality. This
is not to deny reports of official Mexican corruption emerging
from all sides, particularly in light of recent disclosure concerning
the abuses of Mexico's anti-narcotic officials, but rather to clarify
that much of this reporting is speculative, based on undisclosed
informants and documents, and thus difficult to assess objectively.
The natural tendency, however, is to assume the worst about
Mexico's public officials. This tendency plays out in the contin-
ued representation of Mexico's labor regulatory structure as inef-
fective and corrupt.
Second, the majority of those who criticize Mexico's labor
law enforcement lack any significant knowledge of the federal in-
o Hispanic Leader, supra note 68.
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spection structure, the heart and soul of Mexico's labor regulatory
structure. Further, authors who describe the poor performance
and general corruption of labor inspectors often base their con-
clusions on anecdotal evidence and on underdeveloped refer-
ences,71 or on superficial interviews with a limited sample of state
labor inspectors, and not on serious policy analysis. Given their
scant treatment of actual enforcement practices in Mexico, these
negative accounts should be attributed more to extrapolation
from Mexico's troubled political scene than rigorous empirical re-
search.
Third, alternative explanations based on a more intimate un-
derstanding of the workings of Mexico's labor regulatory struc-
ture give a more generous account of Mexico's enforcement prac-
tices. These accounts generally recognize that Mexico's labor
regulatory structure provides Mexico's workers with legal rights
and protections similar to their counterparts in Canada and the
United States73 and attribute existing flaws in Mexico's labor en-
forcement structure to limited economic resources rather than a
lack of political will on the part of the Mexican government, cor-
ruption on the part of government inspectors, or inefficacy at the
enforcement level.74 A number of careful examinations of Mex-
71 See ORTEGA, supra note 61; Smith, supra note 59, at 57; Crandall, supra
note 62; Solomon, supra note 60. These studies rely heavily on three law stu-
dent notes to support their descriptions of Mexico's labor regulatory structure.
See generally Ann M. Bartow, Comment, The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 11
COMP. LAB. L.J. 182 (1990); Goldin, supra note 66, at 203; Peters, supra note
63, at 226. Though these three law stucent notes are an extensive review of ex-
isting literature, their analyses do not benefit from first-hand observation of
the actual workings of Mexico's labor enforcement apparatus. This shortcom-
ing in their analyses needs to be taken into account when examining their
broad assertions with respect to the inadequacies of Mexico's labor policy and
practice.
72 State inspectors technically have the right to enforce federal labor law,
but can only do so in those industries that lie outside of federal jurisdiction. All
the important, strategic industries in Mexico are under federal jurisdiction. In
addition, state labor inspectors do not formulate federal labor policy.
'7 See Befort & Cornett, supra note 55, at 300; Craig L. Jackson, Social Pol-
icy Harmonization and Worker Rights in the European Union: A Model for North
America?, 21 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 1, 38 (1995); Louise D. Williams,
Trade, Labor, Law and Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Mexican
Labor Arising from the North American Free Trade Agreement, 22 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 361, 370 (1996); Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican
Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391, 430 (1993).
' See Befort & Cornett, supra note 55, at 269, 306.
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ico's labor inspection and labor law enforcement systems support
this assessment.
In their review of the steel industry, A.C. Laurell and Mari-
ano Noriega have highlighted the lack of technical resources
available to inspectors." The labor inspectors responsible for
monitoring this industry lack the basic equipment necessary to
conduct an occupational health inspection (sound level meters,
dosimeters, thermometers, light meters, and apparatus to measure
dust and gases). 76 Further, the lack of a sophisticated laboratory
at the offices of such inspectors makes it difficult to correctly
characterize any samples actually taken.7 The observations of the
author during field research with inspection teams confirms this
assessment. Labor inspectors arrive at the factory and conduct
the inspection visit without the benefit of scientific measurement
equipment.
In a working paper published by the U.S.-Mexico Committee
on Occupational and Environmental Health, the members of the
Committee also note the lack of technical equipment available to
inspectors and the negative impact that the absence of such
equipment has on the capacity of labor inspectors to determine
and correct workplace health risks. 78 According to this paper, the
lack of technical resources is not limited to sampling equipment
but includes a deficit of computers, vehicles, and financial re-
sources.
79
An International Labor Organization ("ILO") report further
documents the limited technical and human resources available to
state labor inspectors in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, one of the
strongest industrial states in Mexico." This ILO report, based on
two weeks of field research with state labor inspectors in Monter-
rey, attributes the principal flaws in the inspection system to in-
adequacies in the inspection schedule rather than poor inspector
71 See A.C. LAURELL & MARIANO NORIEGA, LA SALUD EN LA FABRICA:
ESTUDIO SOBRE LA INDUSTRIA SIDERURGICA EN MEXICO 195 (1989).
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See ORTEGA, supra note 61.
79 See id.
80 See ANSELMO GARCIA, ET AL, DRAFT REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR ON LABOR INSPECTION IN MONTERREY (1993) (Mexico City: Interna-
tional Labor Organization).
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training, attitude, or performance."1 The inspection schedule al-
lows state inspectors only one hour to inspect small businesses
(less than 50 employees), two hours for inspections of medium-
sized businesses (50-500 employees), and three hours for inspec-
tions of large businesses (500-1,000 employees). 2 Such an unreal-
istic schedule barely allows for the travel time between factories,
let alone a comprehensive inspection of workplace facilities, re-
view of appropriate documentation or interviews with manage-
ment and workers8 3 Further, it does not account for other obli-
gations that consume the time of labor inspectors, including
follow-up, re-inspection, public presentation, and consultation. 4
The over-burdening of the inspectors' schedule in this way re-
duces the inspectors' ability to enforce work standards and work-
place norms.
This ILO direct observational research paints a picture of a la-
bor enforcement system that, though over-burdened, seeks to
protect Mexico's laborers. The report recognizes that limitations
in technical and financial resources hamper the effective function-
ing of Mexico's labor regulatory structure. Other ILO reports
have considered the importance of these sorts of limitations to la-
bor inspection worldwide. The 1992 World Labour Report at-
tributes difficulties in effective enforcement of workplace safety
and health standards throughout the developing world to a lack
of resources rather than an absence of political commitment to
the enforcement of such standards. 6 Mexico's enforcement prob-
lems can be viewed from such a position. As Stephen Zamora
notes,
[i]t should not surprise U.S. citizens that labor conditions
in Mexico are often below the standards of those enjoyed
in the United States. The same is true, unfortunately, of
many other conditions of life in Mexico, including hous-
ing, public health, streets and highways, transportation-
the list is a long one. Mexican citizens routinely endure
81 See id.
82 See id.
13 See id.
" See id.
85 See id.
86 See INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, WORLD LABOUR REPORT 5, 81 (1992) (not-
ing that many developing countries' governments lack resources to tackle such
problems as inadequate infrastructure and lack of housing planning).
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he list is a long one. Mexican citizens routinely endure
conditions that would be considered intolerable in the
United States. 7
Zamora concludes that "[d]espite cynical views to the con-
trary, the Mexican government is trying to improve these condi-
tions.""8 Mexico's relative poverty (its per capita income is about
one-tenth of that of the United States) provides the background
to the government's lack of resources, the inspectors' inabilities
to conduct more thorough investigations of such workplace con-
ditions, and the Mexican workers' tolerance of workplace condi-
tions considered intolerable in the United States and elsewhere.
Fourth, and finally, current accounts of the corruption and
dishonesty of labor administrators and personnel in Mexico (par-
ticularly inspectors) fail to consider anti-corruption programs in
place at the Ministry of Labor. Specifically, the Ministry of La-
bor supervises the work of labor inspectors in four manners.
First, Ministry administrators evaluate the accuracy and legality
of each official Inspection Report submitted by a labor inspector
for any irregularities. Second, the Ministry's Department of In-
ternal Affairs carries out investigations following an employer
complaint concerning a specific labor inspector and labor inspec-
tion." Third, the Ministry of Labor's Comptroller dispatches
auditors each year to review the quality of federal labor inspec-
tion practices. Fourth, the General Division of Federal Labor In-
spection organizes internal supervisory inspections to verify that
inspectors carry out their work effectively and honestly and to
eliminate inspection practices that contravene the mission of in-
spection.' In fact, these supervisory inspections represent about
three percent of the total inspections conducted by the Ministry
of Labor, and inspection administrators consider these inspections
87 Zamora, supra note 73, at 432.
88 Id.
89 Sources within the Direcci6n General de Inspecci6n Federal del Trabajo
("DGIFT") however, commented that these inspections were not part of a co-
herent, formal supervisory inspection program. Instead, in the previous in-
spection administration, they were invoked infrequently when the Director
General wanted to gather the information needed to fire an incompetent or
corrupt inspector.
' See INTERNAL MANUAL, supra note 44, at 1.
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to be the most important manner for monitoring the work of
Ministry of Labor inspectors.
A number of general goals orient the Supervisory Inspection
Program. First, and most importantly, it seeks to improve labor
inspection by detecting improper inspection practices. In this
sense, supervisory checks allow inspection administrators to deal
with labor inspectors whose inspection practices, due either to
plain error or illegal intent, diverge from Ministry policy.91 Sec-
ond, supervisory inspections attempt to ferret out and correct in-
spection reports flawed by improper inspection practices. Where
such inspection reports contain serious errors, the Ministry an-
nuls their legal effect.92 Third, supervisory inspections alert in-
spection administrators of labor inspectors who are in need of ad-
ditional training, and, 'thus, they serve an in-house training
purpose. Finally, such supervisory efforts to detect improper and
illegal practices have an indirect deterrence function. In the exer-
cise of their duties, labor inspectors are aware that their inspec-
tion practices might be the subject of a supervisory inspection.
Thus, at least in theory, they are less likely to commit errors or
fall into corrupt practices. To reinforce this deterrence factor, the
results of each supervisory inspection are recorded in the inspec-
tor's personnel file.93
On the surface, supervisory inspections resemble ordinary la-
bor inspections, in that the supervisory inspectors enter factories,
conduct plant tours and document reviews, and submit written
reports concerning their findings. The supervisory inspection
procedure is relatively straightforward and rapid. The inspector
usually begins the inspection by questioning the employer about
the conduct of the previous labor inspector: was the labor inspec-
tor's conduct professional? Did he try to pressure the employer
in any way? Was he unfair or incompetent? Did any problems
arise during the labor inspection? After taking informal notes on
the employer or representative's comments, criticisms, or doubts,
the supervisory inspector moves on to his evaluation of the pre-
vious inspection.
11 See DIRECCI6N GENERAL DE INSPEccION FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO,
MANUAL DE ORGANIZAcI6N PARA LA SUPERVISION INSPECTIVA EN EL VALLE
DE MEXICO 1-2(Ill,IV) (1996) [hereinafter ORGANIZATION MANUAL].
92 See id 21).
" See id. 2(VI); Confidential Interview, Government Official in the Gen-
eral Division of Federal Labor Inspection (Dec. 1996).
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The formal Supervisory Inspection Program examines all
types of inspections: periodic safety, health, and general work
conditions inspections; verification inspections; and machinery
and equipment inspections, among others. Thus, the evaluation
stage of the supervisory inspection varies according to the subject
matter and type of inspection being reviewed. In essence, the su-
pervisory inspector attempts to repeat as much of the previous la-
bor inspection as possible without abusing the employer's good
will.94 For example, if the inspection was a safety and health con-
ditions inspection, then the supervisory inspector reviews a selec-
tion of the pertinent safety and health documents and conducts a
brief plant tour as if he were carrying out an abbreviated version
of the previous safety and health inspection. If he is supervising a
periodic general work conditions inspection, the inspector will
examine a sample of the employer's payroll, especially with re-
spect to overtime and vacation pay, paying close attention to any
differences in his review and the review recorded in the previous
inspection report.
By redoing at least part of the previous inspection, the super-
visory inspector is able to assess whether the previous inspection
report, and thus the work of the previous labor inspector, repre-
sents the actual conditions encountered in the factory. In this
way, the supervisory inspector can discover omissions or misrep-
resentations committed by the previous labor inspector. For ex-
ample, the supervisory inspector may detect safety and health
measures recorded as fully completed in the inspection report
which actually remain partial, egregious payroll violations ig-
nored, and authorized safety procedures which should have been
declared incomplete.
The supervisory inspector records all of his observations in a
brief, one page Supervisory Inspection Report. In this report, any
omissions or misrepresentations made by the previous inspector
are highlighted in the official Inspection Report under supervi-
sion. The supervisory inspector submits the Supervisory Inspec-
tion Report on the next working day to Ministry administrators.
If the Supervisory Inspection Report serves to underscore any ir-
regularities, these administrators review the case in order to de-
termine whether or not the responsible inspector should be sanc-
" The inspector purposefully limits the scope of his evaluation of periodic
inspections. Only the most tolerant employer would allow a supervisory in-
spector to repeat a complete periodic inspection.
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tioned.5 In this review, the ministry administrators consider the
seriousness of the inspector's violation, the inspector's record,96
and whether this matter constitutes a repeat violation in the in-
spector's record, the inspector's seniority, the size of the eco-
nomic benefit or harm created by the violation, and, most impor-
tantly, the sanctions allowed by federal labor law.9' Potential
sanctions range from a warning, censure, suspension, fine, or dis-
missal to temporary prohibition from public service.98
In 1996, the General Division of Federal Labor Inspection
conducted 561 supervisory inspections in Mexico City and the
surrounding metropolitan area, in total representing 2.7% of the
20,751 inspections conducted in this zone. 9' Forty-seven of these
561 supervisory inspections (just over 8%) uncovered inconsisten-
cies or omissions warranting further investigation by Ministry of-
ficials. These forty-seven investigations resulted in the sanction-
" See DIRECCI6N GENERAL DE INSPECCI6N FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO,
PROCEDIMIENTO PARA LA SUPERVISI6N INSPECTIVA EN EL VALLE DE MEXICO
2 (1996).
96 The inspector's personnel records include the results of all previous su-
pervisory inspections of his work. See id. at 1.
97 See ORGANIZATION MANUAL, supra note 91, S 2(V).
98 See id. SS 4(-VI), 5. According to federal labor law and the guidelines
set forth by the Supervisory Inspection Manual, warning or censure is appro-
priate in those circumstances where an inspector fails to identify himself prop-
erly, to conduct an inspection during work hours, or to review the pertinent
general work conditions or safety and health documents. See Inspection Law,
supra note 27, arts. 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 28, 31, 33-36. Suspension from three days
to three months is called for where an inspector has failed to note a labor law
violation or to propose the appropriate measures to rectify a safety and health
condition in the factory which constitutes a violation of labor law or danger to
workers. See id. arts. 20, 24, 32 (art. 54-1 controls sanctions in those cases of
recidivism). Dismissal, however, should only occur where the inspector falsi-
fies information in the inspection report, fails to notify inspection administra-
tors of violations of federal minimum wage laws, or receives bribes or other
economic incentives related to the inspection. See id. arts. 23, 24, 52. Fines are
calculated at two times the value of the profit gained and the damages caused
by the inspector's illegal behavior in those cases where economic sanctions are
deemed appropriate by the Director General. See "Ley Federal de Responsi-
bilidades de los Servidores Publicos," D.O., 31 de deciembre de 1982, arts. 47,
55. Where the violations of federal labor law are egregious, the inspector can
be prohibited from public service for one to ten years. See id. art. 53. Finally,
the Supervisory Inspection Manual allows for the exculpation of the inspector
on one occasion and only by Ministry administrators. See id art. 63.
" Supervisory inspections now represent 10% of the total inspections con-
ducted in this area. See Letter from Subsecretary Javier Moctezuma Barragan
(Dec. 6, 1999) (on file with author).
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ing of eleven inspectors, seven warnings, and four suspensions
ranging from three to five days. No inspectors were terminated
as the result of any of these investigations."
The above examination explains how the Supervisory Inspec-
tion Program serves to discipline corrupt inspectors and to deter
future improper acts as well as to alert administrators to the need
for further training of inspectors who unintentionally commit er-
rors. All of these activities seek to improve the performance and
public image of the Ministry of Labor's inspections and should be
considered in any balanced account of Mexico's labor law en-
forcement practices.
The discussion in this section has highlighted four major fac-
ets of the current international view of Mexico's labor regulatory
structure. First, the commonly held view often arises from specu-
lative accounts that struggle to describe the "massive and perva-
sive""' non-enforcement of labor standards in Mexico based on
" Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsi6n Social (Direccion General de Inspec-
cion Federal del Trabajo), Nota Informativa (1997). Last year, inspectors were
given warnings for the following failures in their duties:
1) omission of information relating to factory over-time, work shifts, and cul-
tural activities in the official Inspection Report;
2) verification of a workplace safety and health remediation measure-the
placement of anti-slip tape across the steps of certain factory stairways--as fully
implemented in the official Inspection Report, when this measure was only
partially completed;
3) description of the Factory's Internal Regulation as published and posted in
the administrative offices of the factory in the official Inspection Report,
though this Regulation was neither published nor posted.
Inspectors were suspended for the following transgressions:
1) verification of two workplace safety and health remediation measures-the
placement of anti-slip tape on the stairs and ramp leading to the factory cafete-
ria and correction of several cracks and holes in the forift lane in the factory
warehouse-as implemented in the official Inspection Report, when neither
measure had been completed by the factory management (warranting a three
day suspension without salary);
2) verification of four workplace safety and health remediation measures-the
replacement of safety warning signs, the repair of several broken lights, the
placement of covers on toilets, and the painting of tubing with the appropriate
safety colors throughout the factory-as implemented in the official Inspection
Report, when none of these four measures Vad been completed by the factory
management (warranting a five day suspension without salary);
3) failure to carry out an inspection duly ordered by the General Division of
Federal Labor Inspection (warranting a five day suspension without salary).
The above six cases of warnings and suspensions are recorded in official, but
confidential, Ministry of Labor documents.
101 Helfeld, supra note 58, at 368.
[Vol. 21:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss1/1
LABOR LA WENFORCEMENT INMEXICO
both a loose reading of Mexico's chaotic political scene and com-
mon stereotypes of Mexicans and their public officials. Second,
these commentaries lack a substantive understanding of the heart
and soul of Mexico's labor law enforcement structure- federal
labor inspection- and, thus, present an imperfect picture of labor
law enforcement in Mexico. Third, those research studies that
benefit from an understanding of actual workplace regulation
paint a more realistic picture. According to this view, Mexican
officials may inadequately enforce Mexico's labor law, but this in-
adequacy is generally a function of scarce resources rather than of
a lack of political will, a structureless inspection system, or cor-
ruption and incompetence on the part of government administra-
tors and inspectors. Fourth, Mexico's Ministry of Labor is aware
of and concerned about the threat that official corruption poses to
the vitality of Mexico's labor regulatory structure. Thus, to pro-
tect its enforcement practices against the scourge of bad acts by
government officials, it has created a number of internal mecha-
nisms to monitor the activities of the labor inspectors who en-
force Mexico's labor law in the workplace.
These four observations taken together question the validity
of the idea that Mexico bears the burden of an ineffective and dis-
organized labor regulatory structure (the first component of the
North American Social Dumping argument). The above discus-
sion reveals the dearth of actual research that exists concerning
the workings of Mexico's labor regulatory structure or the moni-
toring system it employs to combat corrupt enforcement prac-
tices. In this light, many of the shortcomings ascribed to Mex-
ico's enforcement apparatus are perceived rather than real. Such a
position, however, should not ignore the fact that Mexico's in-
spection system falls short of its own ideal of perfect employer
compliance. The limitations of this system, however, are more
properly explained by the technical and economic limitations
characteristic of most developing economies, rather than by the
view of Mexico's enforcement structure as an administrative dis-
aster, staffed by corrupt inspectors and unconcerned administra-
tors. Despite such resource limitations, Mexico's labor regulatory
structure still works to protect Mexico's workers from illness and
injury, organizing nearly 50,000 workplace inspections and sanc-
tioning nearly 5,000 employers for the violation of Mexico's de-
manding labor standards each year.
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4. A STRAW DOG: THE SPECTER OF SOCIAL DUMPING
IN MEXICO
In the preceding section, the discussion questioned the first
argument underpinning the North American Social Dumping
Theory, which maintains that Mexico lacks a well-developed and
effective labor regulatory structure. The second argument of the
North American Social Dumping Theory suggests that such weak
labor regulation (and the stricter regulation found in the United
States and Canada) promotes social dumping in Mexico. Recent
analysis of the effectiveness of the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA"), the principal government
agency responsible for the enforcement of health and safety stan-
dards in the workplace in the United States, casts doubt on the
second argument of the social dumping theory. Specifically, this
research suggests that the enforcement of U.S. occupational
health standards does not create a regulatory environment that
causes the "wholesale exodus" of major U.S. and Canadian indus-
tries to Mexico. 2 Such studies of labor regulation in the United
States range from outright attacks on the incompetent administra-
tion of OSHA" and stinging condemnations of the weakness of
the U.S. federal laws that the agency supposedly upholds,1" to less
virulent suggestions that the work of OSHA has no discernible
impact on occupational injury or disease rates."' 5 If it is true, as
102 Charles Levenstein & Stanley Eller, Occupational Safety and Health
Regulation: An International Labor Perspective, 11 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES
303 (1981) (quoting Barry Castleman, The Export of Hazardous Factories to De-
veloping Nations, 9 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVICES 569 (1979)).
103 See John Hood, OSHA's Trivial Pursuit, 73 POL'Y REV. 59, 60-61, 64
(1995) (arguing that what little value OSHA adds as a regulatory agency is far
outweighed by the loss in productivity and wages and the increase in taxes and
prices that its regulatory practices create); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY
A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION vii, viii (1993) [here-
inafter WORKERS] (recognizing that OSHA's ability to fulfill its mandate has
been crippled by poor administration of the agency); Kitty Calavita, The De-
mise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration: A Case Study in Sym-
bolic Action, 30 Soc. PROBS. 437, 447 (1983) (analyzing how OSHA was de-
signed largely as a "symbolic message" rather than a politically committed
regulatory agency).
104 See WORKERS, supra note 103, at 13 (recognizing the failure of OSHA
to promulgate "adequate regulations" for a number of health hazards, most
particularly occupational diseases); Levenstein & Ellersupra note 102, at 304.
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these studies argue, that OSHA has little to no impact on the
overall U.S. occupational injury and disease rates, the argument
that U.S. industry will move south to Mexico for the purpose of
avoiding stringent occupational health and safety controls is un-
tenable.
In addition, proponents of the idea that manufacturers will
move to areas simply to take advantage of a lax regulatory envi-
ronment fail to appreciate the complexity of motives currently
driving the relocation of industry around the world. Several
commentators have demonstrated that, in corporate decisions
concerning whether to build abroad or continue operating a facil-
ity in the United States, differences in environmental and labor
regulations and occupational health costs are generally out-
weighed by the consideration of production and other capital
costs. Further, other traditional regional factors such as access to
markets, proximity of supplies and natural resources, political
stability, wage differentials, corporate tax rates, availability of in-
frastructure, and skilled labor are almost always more important
than the differences in environmental and labor regulatory struc-
tures.
10 6
These studies thwart the argument made by NAFTA critics
(described here as part of the North American Social Dumping
Theory) that U.S. and Canadian industry will relocate to Mexico
specifically to avoid workplace standards and regulations. Given
that current research neither demonstrates the alleged endemic
weakness of Mexico's labor law enforcement structure (the first
component of the North American Social Dumping Theory) nor
establishes that companies seek to relocate to Mexico specifically
to escape workplace regulation (the second component of the
North American Social Dumping Theory), one questions the
third component of the same argument. This third component
105 See Robert Stewart Smith, The Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufac-
turing Injury Rates, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 145, 146-52 (1979) (ar in that
OSHA has not reduced work injuries or improved plant safety and health in
any measurable way); W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and
Health Regulation, 10 BELL J. EcON. 117 (1979) (attributing the relatively in-
significant role of OSHA in reducing occupational injury and disease to the
fact that OSHA's sanctioning capacity is so low as to make the cost of
non-compliance negligible for employers).
106 See CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
INDUSTRIAL PLANT SITING: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK BETTER (1983); see also
Levenstein & Eller, supra note 102, at 303-04.
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asserts that the presence of U.S. and Canadian industry in Mexico
reflects social dumping which has degraded the working condi-
tions of Mexican workers.
To evaluate the effect of U.S. and Canadian manufacturing
operations on worker health and safety in Mexico, one should
consider the role of such operations in the Maquiladora Zone and
the work conditions recorded in this area. The results of research
examining the workplace safety and health conditions in
U.S.-owned factories in the Mexican Maquiladora Zone"7 would
confirm or dispute the third component of the North American
Social Dumping Argument. In addition, examination of this zone
would demonstrate, through indirect evidence, the efficacy of
Mexico's labor regulatory structure in preventing the degradation
of its workers' labor conditions by U.S. and Canadian industry.
5. REALITY OR RHETORIC: WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY IN
U.S.-MEXIco BORDER INDUSTRIES0 8
The Maquiladora Zone, one of the most prominent manufac-
turing zones in Latin America, runs the length of Mexico's north-
ern border and includes almost 1,800 foreign-owned plants within
its perimeter."9 Special provisions of U.S. and Mexican commer-
cial law have allowed foreign-owned industries to manufacture
within Mexican territory since the law was enacted in 1964.110
Critics of the Maquiladora Zone argue that such special commer-
cial provisions are not the only force driving the development of
107 The Maquiladora Zone agreement facilitates cross-border trade and in-
vestment in this small strip of Mexico's border. See NATIONAL SAFE
WORKPLACE INSTITUE, supra note 5.
10. For an earlier, abridged version of this discussion, see Michael J.
McGuinness, Free Trade and Occupational Health Policy: An Argument for
Health and Safety Across the North American Workplace, 36 REVISTA SALUD
POBLICA DE MXICO 8 (1994).
109 See NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INSTITUTE, supra note 5.
110 The Mexican Tariff code allows for the duty-free importation of
equipment and raw materials to supply foreign manufacturing operations along
the Mexican border, so long as the finished products are exported out of Mex-
ico. The U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, articles 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80,
permit goods, 80% assembled from U.S. components, to be re-imported for
sale with taxes paid on only the value added during assembly. This value added
is calculated on the basis of the cost of domestic Mexican wages (which consti-
tute about one-seventh of the cost of U.S. wages) and not on the product's
market value. See id. This combination of U.S. and Mexican law minimizes
the tariffs incurred in crossing the border in each direction. See id.
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the Zone. In a version of the North American Social Dumping
Theory, they assert that foreign corporations manufacture in
Mexico in order to take advantage not only of tariff provisions
but also of the lax occupational health and safety regulatory appa-
ratus that leaves workers, consumers, and the local environment
unprotected."1 These assertions merit consideration in light of
the preceding discussion.
Numerous accounts have described a "dark side" of the Ma-
quiladora Zone. These narratives characterize the northern bor-
der of Mexico as a place where foreign capitalists arrive eager to
exploit Mexican workers desperate for a job, where workplace
health and safety regulations are no more than paper standards,
where overworked workers return each night to squalid living
conditions.' The workplaces commonly described in these writ-
ings contain excessive levels of noise, airborne particles from tex-
tiles, gases, vapors, highly toxic chemical substances, and con-
taminants. The workers exposed continuously to such aggravants
report a common universe of symptoms: headaches, exhaustion,
sprains, coughs, inflammations, pain and swelling of the eyes, dif-
ficulty breathing, itching and rashes, irregularities in their men-
strual cycle, irritability, and insomnia."' According to these de-
scriptions, these symptoms arise out of the workers' consistent,
unprotected exposure to environmental stressors and the oppres-
sive labor culture inherent in the Maquiladora Zone.
Elements of this ethnographic description of the "dark side"
of the Maquiladora Industry, though based on the limited obser-
vations of single researchers and exaggerated in press accounts,
have been confirmed by a survey report conducted by the Uni-
versity of Lowell Work Environment Program in the border cit-
ies of Matamoros and Reynosa. The study, entitled Back to the
"I See id. at 5.
112 See MARiA PATRICIA FERNANDEZ-KELLY, FOR WE ARE SOLD, I AND
MY PEOPLE: WOMEN AND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO'S FRONTIER (1983) (describ-
ing ethnographically substandard work conditions in the Maquiladora Zone);
NORMA IGLESIAS PRIETO, LA FLOR MAS BELLA DE LA MAQUILADORA:
jISTORIAS DE VIDA DE LA MUJER OBRERA EN TIJUANA, BCN (1985) (portray-
ing the treatment and the labor culture encountered by young fem le Maquila-
dora workers).
113 See IGLESIAS PRIETO, supra note 112, at 52-53.
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Future: Sweatshop Conditions on the Mexico-U.S. Border,"4 quanti-
fies the poor working conditions encountered in the Maquiladora
industry and their effect on the labor force, conditions described
in more narrative accounts by the studies reviewed above.
Using an occupational health questionnaire that asked work-
ers to describe workplace hazards as well as to report symptoms
of their physical condition, the Lowell Study surveyed 267 Ma-
quiladora workers and gave evidence that Maquiladora workers
commonly suffer from musculoskeletal disorders related to the
rapid pace of work, poor workplace design, and other ergonomic
hazards. The Lowell researchers concluded that workers suffer
acute health problems from chemical exposure that have the po-
tential to develop into a variety of chronic medical conditions."'
Most important, the study correlated health risks that respon-
dents to the questionnaire reported as present in the workplace to
their related impact on the health status of the worker, as defined
by the worker's self-reported health symptoms.
Of those workers interviewed, over half reported contact with
gas or vapor during part of their day." 6  The following
self-reported health complaints were common among this group
of respondents: headache (55%), unusual fatigue (53%), depression
for no specific reason (51%/6), forgetfulness (41%), chest pressure
(41%), difficulty in falling asleep (39%), stomach pain (37%), diz-
ziness (36%), and numbness or tingling (33%)."' Those respon-
dents who reported exposure to some airborne substance during
all of their shift had additional health problems, with 41% experi-
encing nausea or vomiting and 29% experiencing eye or nose se-
cretions."' A significant number of workers complained of expo-
sure to noxious physical agents or ergonomic stressors: noise
(67%), heat (27%), vibration (48%), bad lighting (27%), intense
visual demands (37%), uncomfortable work posture (32%), repeti-
tive movements (66%), forceful manual work (32%), and a heavy
physical work load (17%). A significant number of those exposed
to vibration reported nausea or vomiting (39%), stomach pain
114 RAFAEL MOURE, FINAL REPORT. BACK TO THE FUTURE: SWEATSHOP
CONDITIONs ON THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER (1991) [hereinafter Lowell
Study].
11 See id. at ii.
116 See id. at 31.
117 See id. at 32.
"I See id. at 34.
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(40%), headaches (62%), loss of sensation (23%), and urinary prob-
lems (9%) as regular health complaints 9 Those continuously
exposed to heat also experienced nausea or vomiting (47%), head-
aches (63%), and urinary problems (12%)."12
The study's disturbing correlation of the risks present in the
workplace to the health complaints common among laborers
supports the belief that the Maquiladora industry places its work-
ers in danger and that such treatment has tangible health conse-
quences for the workforce.121 Combined with ethnographic ac-
counts of the lives of female Maquiladora workers, the survey
responses paint a dark portrait of the Maquiladora Zone.
Despite the harsh assessment of its negative impact on the
health of its workers described above, the Maquiladora Industry
has its defenders. Recent studies published by research teams
working on the Maquiladora problem question the validity of
claims that Maquiladora manufacturers are guilty of gross exploi-
tation of the Mexican worker and abuse of his or her health.
Two recent studies suggest that the negative image of the Maqui-
ladora Zone, considered the "ugly duckling" of Mexican devel-
opment, is undeserved.
Researchers studying female Maquiladora laborers adminis-
tered a health status questionnaire in 1988 to 108 residents of Ti-
119 Id. at 38.
120 Id. at 39.
121 Three factors do, however, complicate this study. First, its sample in-
cludes fewer than 300 respondents. Second, its researchers could not gain ac-
cess to even one Maquilad-ora workplace. Thus, they were unable to differenti-
ate between causative agents in the laborers' living and work environment,
correlating actual workplace conditions to the health complaints listed by
workers. Third, the study relies entirely on the self-reported physical com-
plaints of the surveyed workers. Recent research, however, has demonstrated
that an individual's self-perception of health status often correlates with educa-
tional level, with those who are educationally privileged and, ironically, in bet-
ter health, frequently reporting higher incidences of illness than less socially
and economical, advantaged populations. Educational as well as other social
factors may wellbe influencing the Maquiladora workers' self-reported symp-
toms, distorting the conclusions based on the above public health question-
naire. Despite these significant drawbacks, this study represents one of the few
important documents that attempts to quantify and evaluate the Maquiladora
workers' experience of health and safety conditions at work. See Amartya Sen,
Objectivity and Position: Assessment of Health and Well-Being, in HEALTH AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 115 (Lincoln C. Chen et al.
eds., 1993).
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juana between the ages of 15 and 35.122 The members of the study
population were employed either in the Maquiladoras, in alterna-
tive sectors of the economy, or in their own homes."l ' The sur-
vey based its conclusions on self-reported worker health com-
plaints in nine areas, including: general gastrointestinal/urinary
symptoms, general respiratory difficulties, general musculoskele-
tal complaints, difficulty breathing with mild exertion, coughing,
sore throat, and discolored eyes. 24 Results in the nine measures
of health status among the three work groups demonstrated that
in seven out of the nine categories (not including general gastroin-
testinal/urinary symptoms and general respiratory difficulties),
Maquiladora workers "appear to be healthier than those who
work in other occupations and those who work in the home." 2
A more recent study which relied less wholly on self-reported
symptoms produced roughly equivalent results. In 1990, 480 fe-
male Maquiladora laborers were interviewed with a 45-minute
standardized questionnaire.126 The questionnaire sought to meas-
ure the presence of: 1) functional impediments (presence of at
least one physical health problem that impedes daily activities); 2)
depression; 3) nervousness, tension, or anxiety; and 4) sense of
control, confidence and optimism, in the respondent popula-
tion." The researchers found that, in terms of mental health,
Maquiladora workers were not worse off than service employees
or non-wage earners.12 In fact, the results of the survey suggest
that with respect to functional impediments and nervousness,
" Melbourne F. Hovell et al., Occupational Health Risks for Mexican
Women: The Case of the Maquiladora Along the Mexican-United States Border, 18
INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVICES 617-27 (1988) [hereinafter Hovell].
11 See id. at 620.
124 See id. at 621.
125 See id. at 622-24. These conclusions, based entirely on self-reported
symptoms are subject to the same qualification listed earlier- that educational
and social factors greatly influence a respondent's self-reporting of health
symptoms. See Sen, supra note 121.
126 This questionnaire was a composite of a number of epidemiological in-
struments, including the Hispanic Health and Nutrition Examination, the
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale, Cohen's Perceived Stress
Scale, and the Karasek Scale. See Sylvia Guendelman & Monica Jasis-Silberg,
The Health Consequences of Maquiladora Work." Women on the U.S.-Mexican Bor.
der, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 37, 38 (1993).
127 See id.
121 See id. at 42.
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Maquiladora workers- particularly women working in electron-
ics- are better off than service workers.
129
The conclusion of the more recent study openly recognizes
that their results may not be a "positive evaluation" of the Maqui-
ladora industry but rather "a reflection of the... inferiority of
existing alternatives for women."130 Whatever the true limits of
their scope, the surveys challenge the negative stereotype of the
Maquiladora Zone that dominates press reports and academic
findings.
This short review has perhaps only served to establish the in-
conclusive nature of the available studies on occupational health
and safety in the Maquiladora workforce. Depending upon
which set of studies you consult, your view of industry along the
northern border of Mexico could adhere to either of two very dif-
ferent descriptions of social reality: 1) an industrial strip where
workplace health and safety regulations are no more than paper
standards, where workers are permanently harmed by their con-
stant exposure to dangerous levels of toxic chemical substances
and the oppressive production conditions they labor under all day
in U.S. factories;' or 2) a developing industrial zone where
Mexican workers employed in U.S. factories enjoy healthier lives
than those employed in comparable domestic industries. 32  In
concluding, it is worth making four comments concerning health
and safety conditions in the Maquiladora Zone and the accounts
that describes these conditions.
First, although the number of negative portrayals of the Ma-
quiladora factories far outnumber the positive portrayals, the
speculative and methodologically-soft nature of many of these ac-
counts renders them less than conclusive. Often, they put for-
ward claims that are difficult to substantiate. The quantitative
study conducted by the University of Lowell employs a more so-
phisticated, albeit flawed, methodology to support its negative
characterization of the Maquiladora Zone's effect on worker
health and, thus, stands as an exception to this judgment.'33
129 See id. at 4142.
130 Id. at 43.
131 See generally FERNANDEz-KELLY, supra note 112; IGLESIAS PRIETO, su-
pra note 112; Lowell Study, supra note 114.
132 See Hovell, supra note 122, at 623-24; see also Guendelman & Jasis-
Silberg, supra note 126, at 41-44.
133 See Lowell Study, supra note 114.
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Second, those studies which place the Maquiladora industry in
a better light base their conclusions upon comparisons between
Maquiladora workers and workers in Mexican-owned industries
or workers only informally employed. Such comparisons essen-
tially say nothing more about working conditions in the Maqui-
ladora industry than that they are no worse than those seen in
other sectors of the Mexican economy. It would be hard to argue
that the health conditions for domestic workers or service work-
ers in Mexico set a reasonable standard by which we can judge the
behavior of U.S. and Canadian multinationals in Mexico with re-
gard to worker health and safety. The real comparison should
not be between Mexican Maquiladora workers and Mexican serv-
ice sector employees but rather between Mexican laborers and
U.S. and Canadian laborers employed by the same multinationals
and performing similar tasks.
Third, a number of the studies that consider the health status
of Maquiladora workers employ questionnaires that rely on
self-reported health complaints."' Differentials in educational
level as well as other social factors, as compelling research has re-
cently demonstrated, can easily distort the results of such ques-
tionnaires. 135
Fourth, though the studies reviewed all make important con-
tributions to our understanding of occupational health and safety
conditions in the Maquiladora industry, they alone cannot resolve
debate concerning the impact of foreign industry and investment
on worker health in Mexico. As this review has suggested, no
representation of the Maquiladora industry has a monopoly on
the truth. Thus, review of current evidence does not lead to any
solid determination as to whether U.S. and Canadian industry are
guilty of social dumping in Mexico. This review does, however,
serve to temper criticism of working conditions in this area and
questions the foundation for the third argument of the North
American Social Dumping Theory.
6. CONCLUSION
As the introduction explained, three separate arguments serve
as the underpinnings of the North American Social Dumping
Theory. The first argument asserts that Mexico lacks an effective
134 See Hovell, supra note 122, at 619.
13 See Guendelman & Jasis-Silberg, supra note 126.
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labor regulatory structure. The second maintains that because of
its weak regulatory structure, Mexico is the recipient of heavy so-
cial dumping- in this case, the site of U.S. and Canadian "dirty"
manufacturing industry. The third explains how this social
dumping has degraded workplace safety and health conditions,
causing harm to Mexican workers.
As demonstrated in Section 5, review of the published materi-
als on the Maquiladora Zone does little to resolve debate concern-
ing the impact of foreign corporations manufacturing in Mexico
on workplace health and safety conditions. Depending on the
group of writings selected, views as to the nature of the Maquila-
doras differ greatly. It is, then, a complicated task to draw any
real conclusions from experience in the Maquiladora Zone con-
cerning the current impact of foreign manufacturing on worker
health in Mexico. Thus, the validity of the third and final argu-
ment of the North American Social Dumping Theory, that
NAFTA will lead to the degradation of workplace conditions in
Mexico, cannot be resolved by reference to existing scientific lit-
erature. This argument, then, constitutes the only component of
the North American Social Dumping Theory that is not openly
questioned by the available empirical data.
The recent studies reviewed in Section 4 considering the im-
pact of regulatory agencies in the United States do, however, cast
doubt on their "supposed" efficacy and on the proposition that
these U.S. agencies drive manufacturing industries out of the de-
veloped world and into the regulatory ambit of developing na-
tions. Such studies also question whether there is a lax regulatory
structure in Mexico that serves as a magnet attracting foreign
manufacturing operations, as the second component of the
anti-NAFTA social dumping argument maintains. These studies
suggest that corporate decisions to relocate operations to Mexico,
are, in fact, based on a wide variety of production factors unre-
lated to health and safety regulation in the workplace.
Finally, Sections 2 and 3 of this article question the veracity of
current assessments of Mexico's labor regulatory structure. My
discussion here willingly recognizes the resource and technical
limitations plaguing the enforcement of the Ministry of Labor ef-
forts as well as the corruption and abuse of political office extend-
ing into the highest echelons of Mexico's government. It is less
disposed, however, to accept recent characterizations of Mexico's
labor inspection structure as a disorganized and ineffective system
2000]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
40 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 21:1
without clear procedures, a political commitment to labor law en-
forcement objectives, or professional and honest inspectors. Such
commentaries lack a firm scientific basis.
The incompleteness of such negative commentaries is further
highlighted by Section 2's brief review of Mexico's labor regula-
tory structure and the enforcement efforts organized by this
structure. The picture of Mexico's labor regulatory structure
drawn here in this section is not one of a perfectly-functioning
system. The efforts of federal labor inspectors in Mexico are
hampered by that lack of financial, technical, and human re-
sources common in developing economies. Often, Inspection
Protocols are only partially applied. And, although most inspec-
tors are honest and diligent, inspector corruption continues to
constitute an obstacle to the enforcement of labor law and the
professionalization of the federal inspector corps, although to a
lesser extent than NAFTA opponents would have us believe. De-
spite these shortcomings, this labor regulatory structure serves to
protect Mexico's laborers from accident, injury, or illness at
work, and deserves more careful consideration and study than it
receives from those critics who describe it as a disorganized failure
and argue that it will create wide-scale social dumping in North
America.
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